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The International Law Limits to the
FTC's International Activity: Does the
Law of Nations Keep the FTC at Home?
"[A] great part of the commission's duty is to strike blows in behalf
of the consumer.'
I. Introduction
In 1914, Congress created the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) and vested it with substantial power to regulate commerce,2
both domestically and internationally.3 Many committees and com-
mentators, however, feel that the FTC has accomplished little of
what the 63rd Congress envisioned in 1914." In 1972, a United
States senator accused the FTC of proceeding too meekly' given the
authority the commission possessed.6 The Senator's comments, how-
ever, were directed at the FTC as a whole without making any dis-
tinction between the FTC's conduct domestically as opposed to the
FTC's conduct internationally. The failure to note this crucial dis-
tinction is one reason why the FTC appears to have accomplished
less than expected considering its inherent powers. Although national
policy concerns must direct the FTC's investigations outside the ter-
ritorial boundaries' of the United States, the agency's ability to per-
1. Agricultural-Environmental and Consumer Protection Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1972: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 92d Cong.,
ist Sess. 2673 (1971) [hereinafter Appropriations Hearings]. This statement is taken from a
lecture designed to urge the FTC and its new head, Miles Kirkpatrick, unto greater accom-
plishments on behalf of the American consumer. Senator Gale McGee actually introduced this
quotation by saying:
For a long time many of us [senators] have felt .. .that the FTC over a
long period of time ...seemed to be either sitting on its position rather than
moving with the changing times or in many instances actually retreating from
what its original intent had been . . . that a great part of the Commission's duty
is to strike blows in behalf of the consumer.
Id.
2. For the statutory definition of "commerce," see infra note 24.
3. Act of Sept. 26, 1914, ch. 311 § 5, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
41-64).
4. REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
Sept. 1969, at I [hereinafter ABA REPORT]. For a more recent study which yields nearly the
same conclusions as the ABA REPORT, see generally Hobbs, Antitrust in the Next Decade-A
Role for the Trade Commission?, 31 ANTITRUST BULL. 451 (1986).
5. Appropriations Hearings, supra note 1, at 2673.
6. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
7. See generally Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight
of Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587 (1982) [hereinafter Kovacic].
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form internationally is not a wholly domestic consideration.8 To
properly evaluate the FTC's performance over its history, the inter-
national law limitations9 to the FTC's conduct should be considered
separately from the domestic limitations.
This Comment demonstrates that it is deceptive to evaluate the
FTC's conduct without distinguishing its domestic from its interna-
tional activity because factors outside the FTC's control often regu-
late its conduct internationally. First, this Comment discusses the
FTC's genesis with specific reference to the statutes which grant the
FTC its international jurisdiction. Second, a significant criticism of
the FTC's accomplishments is noted. Finally, this Comment ad-
dresses the theoretical extent of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of
the FTC and the existing international law limitations upon the
FTC's conduct.
II. The Broad Congressional Grants of Authority to the FTC
The Federal Trade Commission, more than any other govern-
mental agency, is ideally situated to undertake and resolve the com-
plex economic and legal issues which dominate antitrust litigation.
Its broad investigatory powers,"0 institutional expertise," and equita-
ble remedies 2 enable the FTC to locate, address, and curtail activi-
ties which have a negative impact upon commerce. 3 This makes the
FTC a very powerful enforcement agency. 4
A. The Creation of the FTC
The United States Supreme Court has held that a state has ple-
8. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
9. As developed in part V of this Comment, "international law limitations" will refer to
state sovereignty principles, the act of state doctrine, judicial review of FTC's action, and
blocking statutes passed by individual sovereigns.
10. The FTC's broad antitrust investigatory powers are set out in § 9 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
[T]he Commission shall have power to require by subpoena the attendance
and testimony of witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence
relating to any matter under investigation . . . Such attendance of witnesses,
and the production of such documentary evidence, may be required from any
place in the United States, at any designated place of hearing. And in case of
disobedience to a subpoena the Commission . . . may invoke the aid of any
court of the United States in requiring the attendance and testimony of wit-
nesses and the production of documentary evidence.
In addition, the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 46(h), authorizes the FTC "[tjo investigate, from time
to time, trade conditions in and with foreign countries where associations, combinations, or
practices of manufacturers, merchants or traders, or other conditions which may affect the
foreign trade of the United States, and to report to Congress thereon, with such recommenda-
tions as it deems advisable."
II. Kovacic, supra note 7, at 597.
12. FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53.
13. The heart of the Federal Trade Commission Act is § 5(a)(l). See infra note 23 and
accompanying text.
14. Kovacic, supra note 7, at 597.
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nary power to make rules within its own territory."8 Exercising this
plenary power pursuant to its Constitutional authority, Congress ini-
tially granted the FTC the jurisdiction to regulate commerce among
the several states and the authority to regulate commerce with for-
eign nations.16
Indirectly, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sherman
Act' 7 led Congress to create the FTC. In Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 8 the Court held that the federal courts would decide on a
case-by-case basis what conduct would violate the Sherman Act.
Congressional intolerance for the Standard Oil's ad hoc decision-
making is illustrated by a statement from the "Cummins Report"' 9
which asserted that it was "inconceivable that in a country governed
by a written Constitution and statute law the courts can be permit-
ted to test each restraint of trade by the economic standard which
the individual members of the court may happen to approve."20
Congress acted upon the "Cummins Report" with new legisla-
tion,21 and the Federal Trade Commission Act was conceived. Sena-
tor Newlands of Nevada, the principle sponsor of the FTC Act, de-
scribed the functions and abilities of the new commission which
Congress was about to charter:
[W]e will organize, as the servant of Congress, an adminis-
trative tribunal similar to the Interstate Commerce Commission,
with powers of recommendation, with powers of condemnation,
with powers of correction similar to those enjoyed by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission over interstate transportation.2
15. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (Mar-
shall, C.J.). ("The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive
and absolute.")
16. For a more complete history of the FTC, see generally Averitt, The Meaning of
"Unfair Methods of Competition" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21
B.C.L. REv. 227 (1980) [hereinafter Averitt]. For citation to the original FTC Act, see supra
note 3.
17. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1973 & Supp. 1989). Generally, the Sherman Act
prohibits any unreasonable interference, by contract, combination, or conspiracy, with the or-
dinary, freely-competitive pricing or distribution system of the open market in interstate trade.
18. 221 U.S. 1 (1911) [hereinafter Standard Oil]. In Standard Oil, the United States
Supreme Court adopted the "rule of reason" as a method of determining whether Standard
Oil, Inc. was a monopolizer or not. The "rule of reason" is a judicial attempt to solve the
problem of how to best interpret the Sherman Act, supra note 17. If left to the United States
Supreme Court, illegal antitrust conduct under the Sherman Act would be conduct in restraint
of trade which the court deemed to be unreasonable in the context of each particular case. See
Averitt, supra note 16, at 231.
19. S. Rep. No. 1326, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. (1915) [hereinafter Cummins Report]. This
report is named for its principle writer, Senator Cummins of Iowa, and originated in the Com-
mittee on Interstate Commerce which was authorized by Senate Resolution 98, 62d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1911), to study the need for new antitrust legislation in the wake of the Standard Oil
decision, supra note 18.
20. Cummins Report, supra note 19, at xii.
21. Averitt, supra note 16, at 232.
22. 47 CONG. REC. 1225 (1911).
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Congress, in empowering its newest "servant," vested the FTC with
the authority to prevent all "unfair methods of competition in com-
merce.""3 Additionally, Congress granted the FTC international ju-
risdiction by broadly defining "commerce" to include "commerce
among the several states or with foreign nations." 4
B. The Wheeler-Lea Act Amendments25 to the FTC Act
Congress has twice expanded the FTC's scope of authority by
supplementing the original language of the initial enabling legisla-
tion with language granting greater jurisdictional reach. As a result,
the FTC's scope over international activities has also been expanded.
The first expansion of the FTC's authority occurred in 1938
when Congress added the phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tice" to section 5 of the FTC Act, which had prohibited only "unfair
methods of competition in commerce" pursuant to the Wheeler-Lea
Act.2" Congress, acting pursuant to the Wheeler-Lea Act, was re-
sponding to the United States Supreme Court interpretation that the
FTC's regulatory authority was limited to those activities which ac-
tually hindered competition. The Supreme Court had defined the
phrase "unfair methods of competition" so that it only applied to
"competition" or conduct occurring between competing business en-
tities. As a result, the FTC had no jurisdiction to control deceitful
business practices aimed at consumers.28 After the Wheeler-Lea Act
amendments, however, the FTC had the capability to prevent "un-
fair methods of competition in commerce as well as unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in commerce." '29
C. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act Amendmentsa0 to the FTC Act
Congress continued its renovation of the FTC's jurisdictional
authority in 1975 with the enactment of the Magnuson-Moss War-
23. For citation to original Act, see supra note 3.
24. The Congressional definition of "commerce" is found in the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §
44:
"Commerce" means commerce among the several States or with foreign
nations, or in any Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia,
or between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory and
any State or foreign nation, or between the District of Columbia and any State
or Territory or foreign nation.
25. Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. 111. The Wheeler-Lea Act granted the
FTC power to protect consumers as well as competitors by allowing the FTC to tackle "unfair
methods of competition" as well as "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."
26. id.
27. FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
28. See Maher, Two Little Words and FTC Goes Local, 80 DiCK. L. REv. 193, 194
(1976) [hereinafter Maher].
29. Id.
30. Act of Jan. 4, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2193.
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ranty Act under which Congress increased the FTC's jurisdiction for
the second time by adding the words "affecting commerce" to sec-
tion 5(a) of the FTC Act. Section 5(a) of the FTC Act now reads:
"Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and un-
fair deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are de-
clared unlawful."31 Section 5(b) continues:
Whenever the commission shall have reason to believe that
any . . person . . . has been or is using any unfair method of
competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting
commerce, and if it shall appear to the commission that a pro-
ceeding by it . . . would be to the interest of the public, it shall
issue and serve . . . a complaint stating its charges . . . .The
person . . so complained of shall have the right to appear...
and show cause why an order should not be entered . . . requir-
ing such person ..... to cease and desist from the violation of
the law so charged . . ..
With the 1975 increase in the FTC's jurisdiction, the commission
was given more jurisdiction over international transactions than
when the FTC Act was first introduced."3
III. Significant Criticisms of the FTC "
Although the FTC has enjoyed an expanded jurisdiction, it has
been observed that the FTC has not always applied its power to the
best advantage. For example, one report, the September 15, 1969
Report of the ABA Commission to Study the Federal Trade Com-
31. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (emphasis added).
32. Id. § 45(b) (emphasis added).
33. Maher, in his article, supra note 28, discusses the full implications of the latest
amendments to the FTC Act.
Note: Section 5 of the FTC Act now addresses foreign commerce in terms of the "effects
doctrine," see infra note 70.
(3) This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involv-
ing commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) unless-
(A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and rea-
sonably foreseeable effect-
(i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign nations,
or on import commerce with foreign nations; or
(ii) on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person en-
gaged in such commerce in the United States; and
(B) such effect gives risk to a claim under the provisions of this sub-
section other than this paragraph.
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1988).
34. The FTC has been the subject of many studies and criticisms. See generally,
Kovacic, supra note 7; Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and
Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REV. 383 (1964); G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION:
A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE (1924). These reports and others focused
on the same themes, criticizing the FTC for failing to establish effective planning and worka-
ble priorities systems, for becoming involved in too many trivial cases, for proceeding too
slowly and ponderously, and for employing an unproductive staff.
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mission,38 proposed that the FTC devote its antitrust resources to
economically significant problems in complex, unsettled areas of law
and economics. The ABA Report recognized that the agency's abil-
ity to perform its role depended heavily upon the actions of institu-
tions outside the agency." The ABA Report, however, was most con-
cerned about the effects Congress and the President were having on
the FTC's ability to act domestically; no recognition whatsoever was
given to the possible international limitations acting against the
FTC.37
From the date of its release, the ABA Report became an ac-
cepted standard for measuring the FTC's antitrust performance.3 8
The ABA Report concluded that the FTC was proceeding too cau-
tiously and urged the Commission to take the lead in dealing with
the difficult and economically important antitrust problems.39 If the
FTC were ever to proceed as the ABA Report suggested, much
would depend upon the attitudes of Congress, the President, the na-
tion at large, and upon the FTC's skill in pursuing those goals.'0
Not surprisingly, the ABA Report's proposals made no distinc-
tions or specific recommendations for the FTC to pursue under its
35. On April 18, 1969, President Nixon wrote to the President of the American Bar
Association, William T. Gosset, asking that the ABA study and appraise the FTC and include
recommendations for future activities and organization of the FTC. Gosset created a commis-
sion to study the FTC which would include the Chairman of the ABA Section of Antitrust
Law, Miles W. Kirkpatrick as Chairman, two economists, five law professors specializing in
antitrust or consumer protection, and nine practicing lawyers. Most of the Commission's mem-
bers had extensive experience dealing with the FTC. See ABA Report, supra note 4, at 4.
Even though it is twenty years old, the ABA Report is still important to consider when
evaluating the FTC. The ABA Report was a very serious endeavor, recommending that if the
Report's findings were not followed, the FTC should probably be retired. Kovacic, supra note
7, at 601. To prevent the agency from ignoring its recommendations, the ABA warned that the
appropriate alternative to serious reform was the Commission's abolition. ABA REPORT, supra
note 4, at 3.
36. Kovacic, supra note 7, at 591.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. ABA REPORT, supra note 4, at 64. In fact, the ABA Report considered the FTC's
performance less than satisfactory. The cause of this poor performance, the ABA Report con-
cluded, was the FTC's failure to take advantage of the unique strengths conferred upon it by
Congress in 1914. Id. See also, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
Specifically, the report wanted the FTC to distinguish itself from the Department of Jus-
tice by prosecuting more cases with riskier outcomes. The ABA Report urged the FTC to
move away from the economically trivial cases to the economically important; from the "sim-
ple" per se offenses to complex, unsettled areas of law and economics; from encouraging volun-
tary enforcement to hardline compulsory enforcement. Kovacic, supra note 7, at 628.
What this would mean is that the FTC would begin pursuing riskier prosecutions and
losing more cases. Just as county district attorneys enjoy high rates of convictions, the FTC
only pursued those cases it knew it could win. The ABA Report criticized this practice. But
the ABA Report also realized the paradoxical position it was taking. The ABA Report was
criticizing the FTC for not making riskier prosecutions. Yet, if the FTC were to follow these
recommendations, then the FTC would inevitably be criticized for losing too many cases and
not doing its homework, thus incurring the government's displeasure for being too avant garde.
Id.
40. Id.
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international jurisdiction. This is because the FTC does not have a
different strategy for pursuing domestic as opposed to international
activities. 1 Instead, as the recommendations in the ABA Report
suggest, the FTC first determines what enforcement policies to pur-
sue and then enforces them to the fullest extent of its jurisdictional
authority, whether foreign or domestic."2
Although the ABA Report voiced harsh criticism against the
FTC, the criticisms pertaining to the FTC's international activity
may not have been warranted,43 because, in some areas, the FTC is
unable to act." Several of the domestic limitations on the FTC's
ability to act internationally will be discussed in the following
section.
IV. Domestic Limitations to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the
FTC
Although the Constitution gives Congress plenary power to reg-
ulate commerce with foreign nations, congressional power to regulate
international antitrust is limited by international law and comity.'
41. Telephone interview with Ed Glynn, Assistant Director for International Antitrust,
Federal Trade Commission (February 17, 1988).
42. But then if this is true, why maintain separate offices for international antitrust? See
supra note 41. Aside from employing specialists in international law and economics, is there no
difference between foreign and domestic FTC activity?
Glynn seems to think there is none. Part of this reason might be that the FTC has not had
an international office for too long. In 1981, the Reagan administration set up the international
office, and Ed Glynn has been its head ever since.
43. Indeed, the FTC's international activity probably was not even considered. But the
times are changing. More world markets opening up may demand, subject to restrictions
which this article highlights, a more active FTC in the international market.
44. Kovacic, supra note 7, discusses the major hurdles which trip up the FTC. But he
makes no mention of the hurdles which might trip the FTC outside the purely domestic
setting.
45. In the United States, the Constitution is omnipotent. No law is above the Constitu-
tion. The United States is considered to be a dualist country. Dualism respects international
and domestic law as different systems that only interact with each other. Some states hold that
international law takes precedence over domestic law, while other states hold the reverse. This
philosophy is contrasted with the monist theory which considers international law and domestic
law as part of a whole body of law, normally treating international law as superior to (and as
delegating authority to) domestic law. Oliver, International Law and Foreign Investigatory
Subpoenas Sought to be Served Without the Consent or Cooperation of the Territorial Sover-
eign: Impasse or Accommodation?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 409, 418 (1982) [hereinafter Oli-
ver]. See generally, SWEENEY, OLIVER & LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2d ed.
1981).
In the United States, an Act of Congress which violates a principle of international law is
not automatically invalidated. The courts have the authority to say what the law is and
whether a law is constitutionally valid. Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (1803). Neverthe-
less, up to now, no court has ever held that international law is superior to that of the Consti-
tution. Oliver, supra at 420.
Yet, the United States does not ignore international law principles. President Eisenhower
said it well in his inaugural address:
Honoring the identity and heritage of each nation of the world, we shall
never use our strength to try to impress upon another people our own cherished
political and economic institutions.
Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE
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The Supreme Court indicated this principle early in the history of
the United States by recognizing that no state may exercise sover-
eign powers within the borders of another state without the latter's
consent .4  Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has rati-
fied a series of actions by the Department of Justice where the
United States has asserted jurisdiction over agreements made
outside the territorial limits of the United States governing trade and
commerce. The jurisdictional nexus, according to the courts, has
been found when some "effect" of the agreement has been felt
within the United States itself.
47
A. Delegation of the Extraterritorial Authority to the FTC
As indicated earlier,4 8 Congress has delegated some of its au-
thority to regulate commerce to the FTC.4 The FTC's authority to
regulate international commerce originates in the FTC Act and the
FTC's authority to enforce the FTC Act.3 0 Section 5(a) of the Act
includes, as a jurisdictional feature of the statute, the authority to
regulate "trade or commerce with foreign nations."51 Congress had
authority to enact and the FTC has authority to enforce the Act only
because the FTC Act is within the Constitutional delegation of au-
thority to Congress "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several states, and with the Indian Tribes.""2
B. FTC's Ability to Regulate Conduct of Citizens Abroad
After the Wheeler-Lea Act," the FTC's authority to regulate
United States citizen's conduct occurring outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States has never been seriously ques-
tioned." The scope and power of that authority was demonstrated in
Branch v. FTC.58
In Branch, the FTC issued a cease and desist order 56 ordering
L.J. 655, 662 (1954) [hereinafter Whitney].
46. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (Mar-
shall, C.J.).
47. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United
States v. General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); United States v. Imperial
Chemical Industries, 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), final decree entered, 105 F. Supp.
215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See infra note 70 and accompanying text. See also, Whitney, supra
note 45, at 655, note 1.
48. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
49. Id.
50. FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 44. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
51. Id.
52. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8(3).
53. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
54. Nationality has always been a basis for a state to exercise jurisdiction. Restatement
(Second), infra note 68, § 10.
55. 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
56. FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53.
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Branch to discontinue soliciting a phony "diploma mill" in Latin
America."' Branch contested the order, complaining that the FTC
had no jurisdiction over his "institute" because the advertising oc-
curred outside the territorial boundaries of the United States.58 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected
Branch's appeal. The court reasoned that since the FTC was moti-
vated to protect Branch's competitors engaged in foreign commerce,
as opposed to protecting those residents of central America who may
be injured by Branch's phony activities, 9 the FTC had jurisdiction
to order Branch to discontinue his practices. In so holding, the court
remarked:
The Federal Trade Commission does not assume to protect
the petitioner's customers in Latin America. It seeks to protect
the petitioner's competitors from his unfair practices, begun in
the United States and consummated in Latin America. It seeks
to protect foreign commerce . . . . The right of the United
States to control the conduct of its citizens in foreign countries
in respect to matters which a sovereign ordinarily governs within
its territorial jurisdiction has been recognized repeatedly ....
Congress has the power to prevent unfair trade practices in for-
eign commerce by citizens of the United States, although some
of the acts are done outside the territorial limits of the United
States.6"
The question then left for the court to decide was whether Congress
had delegated to the FTC the power to regulate Branch's activity.6'
57. Branch was offering diplomas and degrees from the Joseph G. Branch Institute of
Engineering and Science. Branch maintained that his school was a correspondence school.
Branch would send his students textbooks and lessons. After passing a final examination, the
student would be awarded a degree or diploma.
Branch's "institute" had no entrance requirements, no resident students, no library or
faculty. The staff consisted of a day laborer, a messenger, eight translators, Branch's daughter,
and a Mexican who had a Bachelor of Science degree from the University of Mexico.
Branch advertised his "institute" in Latin-American countries, maintaining that he oper-
ated an institute of engineering and science in Chicago. The institute posted an impressive
curriculum, offering courses in agriculture, architecture, aviation, mechanical engineering, in-
dustrial chemistry, sugar chemistry, analytical industrial chemistry, dentistry, diesel engineer-
ing, radio and television engineering, automotive engineering, civil engineering, mechanical
engineering, mining engineering, petroleum engineering, sanitary engineering, metallurgy, vet-
erinary science, medicine, biology, bacteriology, law, pharmacy, and several other subjects.
He warranted that his institute was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Illinois,
U.S.A. and was the only officially recognized university in accordance with the laws of United
States for extension courses by correspondence. In fact, the Department of Education of the
State of Illinois had disapproved the entire school. 141 F.2d at 33.
58. Id. at 34.
59. If the FTC were attempting to protect Latin Americans living in Latin America, the
FTC would be invading the sovereign territories of those Latin American countries. See infra
note 72 and accompanying text.
60. 141 F.2d at 35.
61. Without the benefit of the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, supra note
30, the court first had to determine whether or not Branch's activity was commerce. Today,
this determinaton would be whether or not the activity was commerce or affected interstate
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The court found that Congress had granted the authority to the FTC
in § 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
62
C. FTC's Ability to Regulate Foreign Nationals
The Federal Trade Commission Act also allows the FTC to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over foreign nations located outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States. The United States has consistently
applied its own rules of conduct concerning anticompetitive acts of
foreigners outside the territorial United States which produced dele-
terious economic effects within the territorial United States. 3 The
conflict with international law arises when the United States,
through the FTC or the Department of Justice, attempts to punish a
foreign national for acts which occurred outside the territorial
United States but violated the United States' antitrust laws.6 It is
not doubted that foreign nationals are liable for their acts which oc-
cur within the territorial United States. The question is whether an
exemption exists to the principles of territorial sovereignty so that
the United States may prosecute foreign nations for conduct com-
mitted outside the United States, and thus in another sovereign's
territory.65
The leading case supporting this exception to territorial sover-
eignty principles is The S.S. Lotus,66 in which the Permanent court
of International Justice held that a state may punish a foreigner for
his acts abroad if those acts "form a constituent element of a crime
consummated within the territory of the State. '6 7 In this case, a col-
lision between a French and a Turkish ship had resulted in the sink-
ing of the Turkish ship and the deaths of Turkish seamen. When the
French ship later docked in Constantinople, the French officer in
charge when the collision occurred was put on trial in Turkey and
convicted of involuntary manslaughter. France protested the sen-
tence, and both countries resorted to the Permanent Court of Inter-
commerce.
62. At that time, § 5(a) provided: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts of practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." See Maher,
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
63. This result is reached on the principle of law which allows a state jurisdiction to
apply its laws to a foreigner who, for example, shoots bullets into the state's territory, given the
accused has been properly brought before the tribunals of the state. Oliver, supra note 45, at
421.
64. Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws,
63 YALE L.J. 639, 640 (1954).
65. Id. at 643. Note that with the latest language in the FTC Act, the conduct necessary
to trigger FTC action must have a direct, substantial and reasonably forseeable effect on the
foreign commerce of the United States, unless it is import commerce. See supra note 33; see
also, supra note 70.
66. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10/9 at 56 [hereinafter The
S.S. Lotus].
67. Haight, supra note 64, at 644.
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national Justice to resolve the question of whether Turkey had vio-
lated France's territorial sovereignty by prosecuting the French
officer. The court determined that, because the crime had effected
Turkish territory (the Turkish vessel), 8 Turkey could exercise juris-
diction over the Frenchman notwithstanding the fact that the French
officer had at all times remained on board the French vessel:
[I]t is certain that the courts of many countries, ...
which have given their criminal legislation a strictly territorial
character, interpret criminal law in the sense that offenses, the
authors of which at the moment of commission are in the terri-
tory of another State, are nevertheless to be regarded as having
been committed in the national territory, if one of the constitu-
ent elements of the offense, and more especially its effects, have
taken place there . ... "
The S.S. Lotus now stands for the principle of international law
that a state may exercise jurisdiction over a party if the party has in
fact perpetrated conduct in a foreign country which effects the coun-
try asserting the jurisdiction. This measure of jurisdiction has now
developed into the "effects doctrine" upon which the United States
can reach out, through the FTC and its other regulatory agencies, to
regulate conduct by actors who are not located within United States
territory.7"
68. Haight, supra note 64, at 64. The part of the court's opinion holding that the Turk-
ish ship was Turkish territory is generally no longer considered to be valid. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 30 reporters' note [herein-
after RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
69. The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10/9, at 23.
70. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), is also
widely cited to support the "effects" doctrine. In the case, the court of appeals held that Alu-
minum Limited, a Canadian corporation, had formed illegal agreements with other foreign
producers of raw aluminum ingot in violation of United States antitrust laws. Judge Learned
Hand explained a two-pronged test for exercising jurisdiction:
[li]t is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as those in this
[Sherman] Act, without regard to the limitations customarily observed by na-
tions upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which generally correspond to
those fixed by the "Conflict of Laws." We should not impute to Congress an
intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no conse-
quences within the United States. On the other hand, it is settled law . . . that
any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for
conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which the
state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize.
Both agreements would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made
within the United States; and it follows from what we have just said that both
were unlawful, though made abroad, if they were intended to affect imports and
did affect them.
Id. at 443-44 (citations omitted).
Judge Hand's holding has been modified somewhat by Congress in 1982. The Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233 (1982) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.), amended the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1982))
by providing that the FTC Act shall not apply to commerce with foreign nations unless that
conduct has a direct, substantial and reasonably forseeable effect on United States commerce.
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V. International Law Limitations to the FTC's Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction
A. State Sovereignty
If the FTC were to exercise it jurisdiction internationally to the
extent the ABA Report recommended, it would be perilously close to
negating the independent sovereignty rights of nations. In the past,
the United States has trespassed beyond its territorial jurisdiction
and has been corrected by another sovereign. In U.S. v. Imperial
Chemical Industries (ICI),7 1 Great Britain enjoined a British com-
pany from complying with the order of an American court. An
American judge had chosen to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction
by ordering ICI, an English Company, to transfer the title to British
patents in England to an American company. The American court's
order was enjoined in Great Britain as an affront to the international
legal principles of territorial sovereignty. 2
1. The Reserved Domain of Domestic Jurisdiction.-A state
cannot usurp the territorial sovereignty of another state. Problems of
trespass occur when one state, attempting to regulate activity within
its reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction, ultimately regulates
within another states' territory. Sovereignty, however, implies a limit
to the offending states' activity: the territory, or reserved domain, of
another state. Since the offended states' territory is off-limits to
other states, only that state has the authority under international law
to regulate its own domestic territory.7
The United Nations Charter, Article 2, Paragraph 7, recognizes
71. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
72. Judgment by Upjohn, J., in the Vacation Court, August 13, 1952, upheld on appeal,
British Nylon Spinners v. ICI, (1953) 1 Ch. 19. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 287, 1288 (1979) [hereinafter I. BROWNLIE]. Sovereignty is a term of art used
for several purposes including to describe a state's legal personality as well as the incidence of
that personality. State sovereignty is the foundation of the law of nations from which a com-
munity of legally equal states are governed. Sovereignty may be better understood by explain-
ing what it suggests than defining what it is. Describing state A as sovereign means (1) state A
has equality with other states; (2) state A has jurisdiction over a territory and a permanent
population to the exclusion of other states; (3) state A has a duty not to interfere with the
exclusive jurisdiction of other states; and (4) state A has a duty to uphold international law
and fulfill its obligations in accordance with that international law. One of the many narrow
definitions of state sovereignty stresses that each state has absolute authority and an uncon-
trolled state will. Jessup, however, comments that such an interpretation of state territorial
sovereignty to mean each state possesses individual and unchallengeable independence is
the quicksand on which the foundations of traditional international law are built.
Until the world achieves some form of international government in which a col-
lective will takes precedence over the individual will of the sovereign state, the
ultimate function of law, which is the elimination of force for the solution of
human conflicts, will not be fulfilled.
P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 40 (1948) (footnote omitted). Clearly, Jessup defines
sovereignty much differently than Brownlie.
73. 1. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 291.
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the reserved domain of domestic activity wherein no outside interfer-
ence is permitted:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter .... 74
The United States Congress, however, did not need to be con-
cerned with international law limitations when it initially granted
the FTC authority pursuant to the FTC Act to prevent the use of
"unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce75 within the
territorial boundaries of the United States. The United States is a
sovereign nation with the right to the exclusive regulation of its do-
mestic sector. 6
On the other hand, when the FTC's authorization and resulting
activity begins to reach outside the territorial boundaries of the
United States of America and into the jurisdictions of other sover-
eign states, the government may be overstepping its limits. Further-
more, in view of the level of international trade between nations, it is
not uncommon for an activity which begins and appears to operate
completely within a state's domestic setting actually to have dra-
matic results outside the state's borders.7 7 Given the broad "effects"
language in the FTC's enabling acts, the FTC's conduct as it seeks
to fulfill the role given it by Congress can have broad international
consequences.
2. Confusion Over International Jurisdiction.-In order to un-
derstand the conflict which arises between the American "effects"
doctrine for asserting jurisdiction over foreign nationals and the af-
fronts to territorial sovereignty, it is necessary to distinguish be-
tween: (1) a tribunal's jurisdiction over a person before it, and (2) a
tribunal's jurisdiction over subject-matter which may not be before
the court.
74. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. The latter part of this paragraph concludes, "[B]ut
this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."
Chapter VII is titled "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace,
and Acts of Aggression."
75. 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
76. See supra note 72.
77. As stated by Brownlie,
It is widely accepted that no subject is irrevocably fixed within the reserved
domain, but some jurists have assumed that a list of topics presently recognized
as within the reserved domain can be drawn up, including categories such as
nationality and immigration. This approach is misleading, since everything de-
pends on the precise facts and legal issues arising therefrom.
I. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 292 (footnote omitted).
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Subject matter jurisdiction does not automatically occur when
personal jurisdiction exists."8
In international law the guiding rule is that State A may
assert personal jurisdiction over its own nationals for all pur-
poses but over foreign nations only for their acts within its terri-
torial jurisdiction. State A, in asserting jurisdiction over its own
nationals for their acts within the territory of State B, must,
however, refrain from ordering them to act within that territory
in violation of the laws there prevailing. And if State A seeks to
extend its jurisdiction over an act in State B to a national of
State B, this will normally be a breach both of the law and of
the comity of nations. It is in effect a form of aggres-
sion-judicial aggression. 9
Attempting to compare the FTC's conduct abroad with its con-
duct domestically has resulted in confusion about the authority and
jurisdiction of the FTC. The FTC can exercise no more authority
than Congress had to give it. While the Constitution grants Congress
unlimited power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,8 0 the
Constitution did not and could not grant Congress unlimited power
with respect to the commerce of foreign nations.
On an international level, the United States does not have the
same jurisdiction to prescribe laws as it does to enforce those laws.
The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States distinguishes these two kinds of jurisdiction. 1 Having
the capacity to prescribe a law does not mean that the state has the
jurisdiction to enforce the law in all circumstances.8 2 If a state legis-
lature or other government unit" has jurisdiction 4 to prescribe a
rule of law, then the government unit has the authority to make a
law or regulation which is to be observed and followed.8 5 Jurisdiction
to enforce a law is the authority a government unit has to compel
compliance with the rule of law.86
A state cannot enforce a law unless it has the jurisdiction to
78. Whitney, supra note 45, at 656.
79. Id.
80. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 68, §§ 6-7.
82. Id. § 7. The Restatement offers this illustration:
X is a national of State A residing in State B. A has jurisdiction to pre-
scribe a rule subjecting X to punishment if he fails to return to A for military
service. X does not return. A has no jurisdiction to enforce its rule by action
against X in the territory of B.
83. The FTC is an example of such a governmental unit.
84. The FTC's rulemaking authority is derived from its enabling statute. See Federal
Trade Commission Act, § 18, 15 U.S.C. 57a (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 68, § 30 comment a.
86. Id. A state exercises its prescriptive jurisdiction when it enacts a criminal code. The




prescribe the law. Within its territory, a state has jurisdiction to en-
force a rule of law validly prescribed by it. 7 Since each state has
absolute and exclusive power to make rules within its territory, each
state's territorial boundaries limit the exercise of another state's pre-
scriptive jurisdiction. A modern exception to this rule is the "effects
doctrine" where a state has prescriptive jurisdiction over conduct oc-
curring outside its territory which has effects"8 within the state's ter-
ritory in addition to the state's conventional prescriptive jurisdiction
over things or interests located within its territory. 9
The FTC must distinguish its abilities according to prescriptive
and enforcement jurisdiction. Not only is the distinction important
because of the consequences of an FTC action, but also because of
the potential negative effects against the United States. This is a
serious situation because if a state were to enforce a rule for which it
had jurisdiction to prescribe, but no jurisdiction to enforce, any state
adversely affected by the action"' would have a claim against the
offending state in an international tribunal. 91
B. The Act of State Doctrine
92
The act of state doctrine is closely related to a state's inherent
sovereign authority to regulate domestic matters occurring within its
own borders. The FTC is hindered when it attempts to carry out its
international responsibilities because each state has a right to con-
duct its economic activity in a manner which the state feels is in its
own best interests. For the FTC, the conflict with international law
occurs when the FTC wants a foreigner to discontinue a practice
which is illegal in the United States, but legal in the foreign country
where it occurred.
The FTC may confront the same problems with the act of state
doctrine as did the plaintiff in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 68, § 20. "The jurisdiction of the nation within
its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute." The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
88. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
90. For example:
X, a national of State A, kills a man in the territory of State B and escapes
to A. Public officers of B seize X in the territory of A and bring him back to B
for trial. B has jurisdiction to prescribe criminal rules dealing with the conduct
of X but no jurisdiction to take enforcement action in the territory of A. A has a
claim against B ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 68, § 8, illustration 4.
91. Id. § 3.
92. The act of state doctrine complements the doctrine of sovereign immunity and allows
a party to a domestic litigation proceeding to use an act by a foreign state as part of its case or
defense. The doctrine prevents the domestic court from finding the foreign state's actions to be
invalid. See infra note 94.
For a more thorough discussion of the act of state doctrine, see H. STEINER, TRANSNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 721-86, 909-18 (1986).
Spring 1989]
DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Co.9" In this case, the plaintiff and defendant were both corporations
organized under the laws of the United States and were involved in
the banana industry outside the United States. The defendant had a
monopoly in the banana market, and the plaintiff was trying to infil-
trate that monopoly by establishing his own banana plantation and
competing with the defendant.
To stop the plaintiff, the defendant persuaded the government
of Costa Rica to seize part of the plaintiffs banana plantation and
later sell the plantation to the defendant. The plaintiff, in a private
antitrust action, sued the defendant in American federal court, alleg-
ing a violation of the Sherman Act's prohibition against monopolies.
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice
Holmes, affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's com-
plaint on the fundamental principle that "the character of an act as
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the
country where the act is done." 4
The fact that economic conduct may be illegal in one nation and
legal in another is consistent with principles of territorial sover-
eignty. Each state has a right to conduct its economic activity in its
own best interest. According to the United Nations Charter of Eco-
nomic Rights and Duties of States, Chapter II:
Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to
choose its economic system as well as its political, social and
cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, with-
out outside interference, coercion or threat in any form
93. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
94. Id. at 356 (citation omitted). Justice Holmes continued:
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat
him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the
acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority
of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state
concerned justly might resent.
The foregoing considerations would lead in case of doubt to a construction
of any statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territo-
rial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate power. "All legis-
lation is prima facie territorial .... " In the case of [the Sherman Act] the
improbability of the United States attempting to make acts done in Panama or
Costa Rica criminal is obvious, yet the law begins by making criminal the acts
for which it gives a right to sue ....
Id. at 356-57 (citations omitted).
The American Banana decision appears to be a holding contrary to FTC v. Branch, 141
F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944). The Branch court distinguished American Banana from the FTC's
proceeding in Branch because Branch's conduct originated in the states and involved use of the
mails. Therefore, Branch's illegal conduct did not take place outside of U.S. territorial bounda-
ries as did the actions complained of in American Banana. The Branch court concluded:
The exercise by the United States of its sovereign control over its commerce
and the acts of its resident citizens therein is no invasion of the sovereignty of






Every State has the primary responsibility to promote the
economic, social and cultural development of its people. To this
end, each State has the right and responsibility to choose its
means and goals of development, fully to mobilize and use its
resources, to implement progressive economic and social reforms
and to ensure the full participation of its people in the process
and benefits of development."
When the FTC investigates foreign activity, it uses American
concepts of free market and restraints on competition to evaluate the
foreign national's actions." While promoting the free market and
discouraging restraints on competition may be consistent with Amer-
ican principles of individual liberty, in foreign countries certain re-
straints of trade or anticompetitive conduct may be legal. Subse-
quently, pursuant to the act of state doctrine, the FTC should not be
able to prosecute a foreign company for violating American laws if
the foreign company was acting legally in its own country. 9"
The problem the FTC encounters when it attempts to exercise
jurisdiction over this type of conduct is compounded when a state is
inextricably involved and actively promoting the "illegal" conduct.
In International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
(JAM) v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
IAM asserted that OPEC was an illegal cartel conspiring to increase
the price of oil sold to the United States99 by agreeing to limit the
production of oil. Nevertheless, the act of state doctrine prevented
the United States courts from exercising jurisdiction over "criminal"
conduct.1"' The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit explained:
While conspiracies in restraint of trade are clearly illegal
under domestic law, the record reveals no international consen-
sus condemning cartels, royalties, and production agreements.
The United States and other nations have supported the princi-
ple of supreme state sovereignty over natural resources. The
OPEC nations themselves obviously will not agree that their ac-
tions are illegal. We are reluctant to allow judicial interference
95. U.N. CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES chap. II, art. 1.
96. Id. art. 7.
97. See generally Kovacic, supra note 7. It is worth noting that the United States'
approach to these matters has not been entirely consistent.
98. See supra note 92.
99. A classic example of an "unfair method of competition in or affecting commerce."
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
100. Alas, "[a]ll legislation is prima facie territorial." American Banana, 213 U.S. at
357.
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in an area so void of international consensus. An injunction
against OPEC's alleged price-fixing activity would require con-
demnation of a cartel system which the community of nations
has thus far been unwilling to denounce."'
C. Judicial Scrutiny of FTC's Actions
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia addressed the international limitations of the FTC in
F.T.C. v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson (SGPM). °0
In SGPM, the court discussed the propriety of the FTC's authority
to serve subpoenas abroad.103 The court of appeals immediately rec-
ognized potential conflicts between the FTC's international activity
and international law principles. The court refused to believe that
the FTC had free, unlimited authority to subpoena anyone in the
world via registered mail. The court stated:
We cannot, however, simply assume . . . that Congress in-
tended to authorize regulatory agencies in general-and the
FTC in particular-to employ any and all methods to serve
compulsory process when conducting their investigations. When
an American regulatory agency directly serves its compulsory
process upon a citizen of a foreign country, the act of service
itself constitutes an exercise of American sovereign power
101. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Pe-
troleum Exporting Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1361 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Hunt v. Mobile
Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977); Occidental Petroleum v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.
Supp. 92 (C.D. Calif. 1971), affid 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972); Interamerican Refining
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
For a slightly different perspective, consider the following comment from Professor Myres
McDougal:
When Switzerland or Canada or any other country employs its governmen-
tal processes to protect business entrepreneurs in activities which impair the
healthy functioning of community process within the United States, it is inter-
fering with the internal domestic affairs of the United States fully as much as
the United States may be interfering with the internal affairs of such other
country in applying its antitrust laws to the injury-causing activities. Agree-
ments made by private entrepreneurs in Switzerland and Canada, and ostensibly
protected by the laws of those countries, may affect or determine the prices
which I must pay within the United States for aluminum and watches. In an
interdependent world interference by States in each other's community
processes, including economic affairs, is inescapable. The question is by what
principles and procedures such interference can be moderated and made recipro-
cally tolerable in the maintenance and expansion of an international economy.
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIRST CONFERENCE HELD AT To-
Kyo 331 (1965).
102. 636 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1980) [hereinafter SGPM].
103. At the time, the FTC was engaged in a nonpublic antitrust investigation of the
fiberglass industry to determine if certain fiberglass manufacturers and distributors were en-
gaged in acts or practices in violation of section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. ] 45 ](1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). One of the principle targets of the FTC investigation was Compagnie De
Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, a French Company with a subsidiary (Certainteed Corp.)
based in New York City.
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within the area of the foreign country's territorial sovereignty.'"
The court declined to find any statutory authorization permitting the
FTC to subpoena SGPM's records through registered mail for two
reasons.
10 5
First, the court could find no language in the FTC Act authoriz-
ing direct service of investigative subpoenas abroad by means of reg-
istered mail. Section 5(0 of the Act, expressly authorizing service by
registered or certified mail, only applied to complaints, orders, and
other commission processes under section 5 of the FTC Act. The
FTC, however, was not proceeding under section 5 in this case but
instead, pursuant to its authority to issue investigatory subpoenas
under sections 6, 9, and 10 of the FTC Act.10
The SGPM court, searching for a statutory limit to the geo-
graphic range of the FTC's subpoena power, focused on section 9 of
the FTC Act which limited the FTC's subpoena reach to witnesses
and the production of documents containing information relating to
an investigation from any place in the United States, at any desig-
nated place of hearing.107 Relying on this statute, and case law 1 s
104. SGPM, 636 F.2d at 1304. The court premised this conclusion upon a general rule
that "[flederal courts have long acknowledged that the investigatory and regulatory reach of
domestic agencies may, and often must, extend across national boundaries." Id. (footnotes
omitted). The court then cited two cases where this extraterritorial jurisdiction was permitted:
CAB v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979); and Montship
Lines, Ltd. v. FMB, 295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Id. at n.3.
105. Id. The reader will note the dualist implications in the court's language. See supra
note 45. The court said that had there been an express congressional authorization for the
FTC to issue the subpoenas duces tecum, the court would have found in favor of the FTC
regardless of the international law ramifications.
106. SGPM, 636 F.2d at 1307.
107. Id. Section 9 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 49, empowers the Commission:
to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the
production of all such documentary evidence relating to any matter under inves-
tigation ....
Such attendance of witnesses, and the production of such documentary evi-
dence, may be required from any place in the United States, at any designated
place of hearing. And in case of disobedience to a subpoena the commission may
invoke the aid of any court of the United States in requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
Circuit Judge Moore, dissenting in Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464
(2d Cir. 19866), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966), predicted the rationale of the SGPM
court. The DeSmedt court was interpreting statutory language nearly identical to that of the
FTC Act later discussed in SGPM. Moore observed:
When Congress authorized the production of evidence "from any place in
the United States," it is to be presumed that it was aware of the territory em-
braced within the United States. If Congress had intended to enact legislation
authorizing such production "from any place in the world," it is again to be
presumed that it had available sufficiently skilled draftsmen who could have used
"world" instead of "United States"-a not altogether too difficult bit of drafts-
manship. The real difficulty which seems to have faced the majority . . . is to
demonstrate that the "plain" meaning of "United States" is "world.". Even in
this day, when these terms appear to be becoming congruous, I find the supposi-
tion that Congress could not understand the difference, and hence requires judi-
cial legislation to express its real intent, quite incongruous.
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interpreting it, the court refused to hold that the FTC had authority
to subpoena service upon a foreign citizen residing on foreign soil.
Instead, the court decided that the cases10 9 "by no means suggested
that Congress intended the FTC subpoena power to have no place or
manner limits whatever.''' °
Second, the court distinguished between service of notice and
service of compulsory process. The SGPM court believed that the
FTC's attempt to serve SGPM with the subpoena duces tecum was
not merely notice of a pending lawsuit against SGPM but an exer-
cise of compulsory process. The FTC subpoena ordered the SGPM
company to produce documents and threatened immediate sanctions
if SGPM did not comply. 1
The direct assault on international law principles is evidenced
by the commission's potential sanctions against SGPM for failure to
comply with the subpoena duces tecum. If SGPM ignored the FTC's
subpoena, the full enforcement power of the FTC could immediately
be brought against it, including action for enforcement, forfeiture or
penalties, or criminal actions. "' This is a different result than what
could happen if the FTC were merely notifying SGPM of a pending
legal action against it. If the FTC were commencing a lawsuit,
SGPM would have options available to defend itself and could even-
tually appeal the result."'
Id. at 474. Judge Moore added that the Senate had "recognized that the expansion of the
FMC's subpoena power . . . in the face of the strongest possible objection from the State
Department and explicit directives not to produce documents from numerous friendly maritime
nations . . 'would only muddy the waters and do violence to our foreign policy .... . Id.
(citations omitted).
108. Deutsche Lufthansa Akiengesselschaft, 591 F.2d at 951; DeSmedt, 366 F.2d at
464.
109. Id.
110. SGPM, 636 F.2d at 1309.
111. Id. at 1311.
112. 16 C.F.R. § 2.13(a) (1980). The court of appeals discussed the consequences facing
SGPM if it chose to ignore the FTC's subpoena duces tecum:
Summary proceedings may be begun under Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(a)(3), with a
finding of contempt the ultimate penalty. In the event of continued noncompli-
ance, a district court could presumably enforce its order by seizing the noncom-
plying respondent's assets wherever they might be found and lawfully attached,
by holding the officers and agents of the corporation in contempt, or by other-
wise exercising its discretion to punish a potential witness' recalcitrance. Unlike
service of a summons and complaint upon a named defendant, delivery of the
FTC's investigatory subpoena upon a witness carries with it the full array of
American judicial power.
SGPM, 636 F.2d at 1311-12 (footnote omitted).
113. Id. at 1311. The court explained:
Once the respondent is served with a copy of the complaint and the pro-
posed order, he then has the options of meeting with the Commission's counsel
to negotiate a consent order or of proceeding to litigation, the result of which
may always be appealed before any cease-and-desist order may issue. Not until
the cease-and-desist order becomes final, through affirmance by a court of ap-
peals or the Supreme Court..., will the coercive power of the court be directly
brought to bear upon the respondent.
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This distinction between service of notice and service of compul-
sory process has important consequences to all affected, including
domestic citizens, but this distinction has added significance when
the service involves another sovereign. The FTC's attempt to submit
a foreign national to compulsory service of process, without the con-
sent of the foreign sovereign,"" is a direct contravention of the inter-
national law principles of territorial sovereignty. " 5 Professor Wig-
more has discussed the problems international territorial limitations
present when a court, or the Federal Trade Commission, attempts to
subpoena witnesses and documents from abroad:
[T]he forum court in the United States can notify the wit-
ness, requesting him to appear before the United States consul
for deposing, and upon his failure there to appear or to answer
can punish him for contempt (by fine or forfeiture), provided
the witness is a citizen of the United States and otherwise is
subject to a testimonial duty in the forum court; for his civil
duty may extend to conduct abroad as well as at home.
But . . . the forum court cannot issue a subpoena to a wit-
ness commanding him to appear before the consul, for this
would be an attempted exercise of state power within the terri-
tory of the foreign state-an intrusion impossible in legal theory
and in international understanding. " 6
Recognizing the international law implications, the court of ap-
peals criticized the lower district court's enforcement order, noting
that Congress did not expressly provide that the FTC could circum-
vent a foreign nation's judicial authority by sending compulsory
processes through the registered mail.1 7 Reversing the lower court,
the court of appeals concluded that "[iun view of the significant
sanctions conditionally imposed by the agency's subpoena and the
Id. (footnote omitted).
114. Foreign countries may consent to direct service of American subpoenas by signing
an international convention. See, e.g., Multilateral Convention on the Service Abroad of Judi-
cial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, done Nov. 15, 1965, 20
U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S.
115. The SGPM court then borrowed from The S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10/9, at 18. "[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is
that-failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary-it may not exercise its powers
in any form in the territory of another State." Id. May a court make The S.S. Lotus case say
whatever it wants?
At least this principle of international law cited in The S.S. Lotus had the support of the
French government. After the FTC sent its subpoena to SGPM headquarters, the French em-
bassy protested to the United States Department of State that the FTC's direct mailing of its
subpoena to SGPM without cooperation of the French government was "inconsistent with the
general principles of international law and constitutes a failure to recognize French sovereignty
[sic]." The French government urged that any similar actions in the future be pursued through
the proper diplomatic channels. Note to the U.S. State Department from the French Embassy
Regarding the FTC Investigation of SGPM (Jan. 10, 1980).
116. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2195c, at 101 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
117. SGPM, 636 F.2d at 1315.
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foreign sensibilities aroused by the mode of delivery used here, the
district . . . [court] seems mistaken."" 8
D. Blocking Statutes
Given the character of modern business transactions between
companies based in foreign nations, it is no surprise that the FTC
would be seeking to subpoena documents located outside the United
States in the course of its investigations. As the SGPM case illus-
trates, a complete investigation of an antitrust incident involving
non-U.S. residents may violate the law of nations. Some nations have
reacted to U.S. regulatory agency attempts to secure foreign records
pursuant to an antitrust investigation by enacting statutes which
make it a criminal offense to remove business documents ordered by
a foreign authority.119 These statutes, called "blocking statutes," are
assumed to be a direct result of what foreign states have classified as
an American invasion of the territorial integrity of foreign nations,
or judicial aggression. 1 0
These blocking statutes are of two basic varieties. One kind pro-
vides that a government official on his own initiative may decide
whether or not to comply with the request for documents. The other
is a more general, comprehensive prohibition against the production
of any documents requested by a foreign tribunal.2 The Canadian
Province of Ontario enacted a general blocking statute 22 following
an order requiring Canadian paper companies to submit to a sub-
poena duces tecum.1 23 Even though the subpoenas were never is-
sued, 1 4 the Canadian statute still prevents the removal of the Cana-
dian documents from Canada.
In a similar reaction to a grand jury investigation, Great Brit-
ain, the Netherlands, France, and Italy forbade their compliance
with an American tribunal's orders for the production of documents
issued to oil companies within their countries.'25 At the urging of the
United States National Security Council, the grand jury investiga-
118. Id. (footnote omitted).
119. The states that have enacted these statutes have done so pursuant to their inherent
power to regulate domestic affairs. See Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Dis-
covery Orders in Antitrust Litigation, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
120. Id. See also supra note 79 and accompanying text.
121. Id. Sometimes legislation designed to protect general business secrets from a prob-
ing tribunal also has the same result as a blocking statute. Id. Blocking statutes tend to frus-
trate American antitrust investigations, but they have also been enacted as a defense to other
investigative probes by foreign tribunals. See id. at 614.
122. See Business Records Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 54 (1970).
123. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
124. The subpoenas were withdrawn after a conference between those under investiga-
tion and the Department of Justice. Note, supra note 119, at 613 n.5.
125. In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C. 1952).
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tions were discontinued and the subpoena orders were quashed. 12 6
Nevertheless, the Netherlands, in an effort to show its disapproval of
the United States' attempt to reach into the Netherlands' territory,
enacted new legislation which prohibited Dutch residents from dis-
closing any information to a foreign tribunal if the information
sought involved the economic competition and performance of busi-
ness located in Holland."2 7 In other words, the Dutch were telling the
FTC to stay out.
State blocking laws are an attempt by one state to curtail the
extraterritorial regulations of another state. International law princi-
ples of sovereignty guard the reserved domain of every state, and
courts can prevent the FTC from meddling in the affairs of others.
Until other countries agree to accept the FTC's investigatory inva-
sions, the FTC, like it or not, may have to restrict its international
interference.
VI. Conclusion
International law can often keep the FTC from utilizing its in-
ternational jurisdiction. Principles of state sovereignty also shield
states from FTC interference. Additionally, one state may exercise
its authority as a national sovereign and declare that an activity ab-
horred by the FTC is completely legal. Furthermore, courts may de-
termine that the FTC is acting beyond its jurisdictional authority.
Finally, the threat of future investigations has prompted some na-
tions to make cooperation with the FTC a criminal offense.
Nevertheless, all international activity is not denied the FTC.
The United States, as a sovereign state, also has a right to prevent a
foreigner acting outside the United States from injuriously affecting
the United States' international and domestic commerce. If a for-
eigner intends to affect the commerce of the United States and suc-
ceeds in doing so, the FTC may exercise jurisdiction over the for-
eigner in harmony with international law.
As the ABA Report concluded, the FTC has its share of inter-
nal problems which may prevent it from striking its blows fast and
hard on behalf of the consumer. Nevertheless, patrolling today's
commerce with foreign nations as thoroughly as Congress or others
may desire, is not always possible. Therefore, as long as the FTC is
126. See generally, Note, supra note 119.
127. See Economic Competition Act of June 28, 1956 art. 39, stb. 401, amended by Act
of July 16, 1958, stb. 413.
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investigating foreign nations and nationals, any future evaluation of
the FTC should recognize those limitations which often keep the
FTC at home in the domestic forum.
Jesse R. Ruhl
